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Abstract—The packaging model of Android apps requires the
entire code necessary for the execution of an app to be shipped
into one single apk file. Thus, an analysis of Android apps often
visits code which is not part of the functionality delivered by
the app. Such code is often contributed by the common libraries
which are used pervasively by all apps. Unfortunately, Android
analyses, e.g., for piggybacking detection and malware detection,
can produce inaccurate results if they do not take into account
the case of library code, which constitute noise in app features.
Despite some efforts on investigating Android libraries, the
momentum of Android research has not yet produced a complete
set of common libraries to further support in-depth analysis of
Android apps. In this paper, we leverage a dataset of about
1.5 million apps from Google Play to harvest potential common
libraries, including advertisement libraries. With several steps
of refinements, we finally collect by far the largest set of 1,113
libraries supporting common functionalities and 240 libraries
for advertisement. We use the dataset to investigates several
aspects of Android libraries, including their popularity and their
proportion in Android app code. Based on these datasets, we have
further performed several empirical investigations to confirm the
motivations behind our work.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapidly, Android has grown as a popular programming
platform for developers and a worthwhile operating system for
manufacturers. In 2014 alone, over 1 billion of manufactured
devices were equipped with Android, a significant gain from
the 780.8 million shipments in 2013 [4]. These devices, which,
besides smartphones, include a number of household and office
devices such as tablets, personal computers, TV sets, fridges,
washing machines, etc., run a diversity of applications.
Unfortunately, because these apps pervade all human activi-
ties, malicious or malfunctioning apps have become important
threats that can lead to damages ranging from benign (e.g.,
app crashes) to critical (e.g., financial losses with malware
sending premium-rate SMS, reputation issues with private data
leaks, and potentially loss of human lives when apps will
run on Android cars). These threats are further exacerbated
in an ecosystem where thousands of applications written by
hundreds of third-party developers are made readily available
for download by users. Typically, as of July 2015, GooglePlay,
the official market for free and paid Android apps, proposes
over 1.6 million apps in various categories from productivity
and messaging to games and social networking. Antivirus
vendors, which regularly report on the status of malware
spreading, have revealed that Android is now a target of choice
for malicious attacks [1].
The research community has produced a large body of work
for mitigating the emerged threats in the Android ecosystem,
essentially to guard the security and privacy of users. For
scalability and practicability reasons, a substantial number
of the proposed approaches [16], [25], [37] rely on static
analysis to parse the entire code shipped in the app package
to find security problems in code instructions, to extract
features for further processing or simply to compare apps
in large repositories. Unfortunately, because Android develop-
ment paradigm allows to easily include third-party code, in the
form of libraries, a significant portion of an app is eventually
irrelevant to the functionality that it delivers. Common libraries
embedded in app code thus constitute a significant barrier for
the static exploration of applications code. There are indeed
a number of research directions where tasks are hindered by
the presence of common libraries in app code:
Repackaging detection. Techniques for comparing apps to
detect repackaged apps by computing their similarities may
provide inaccurate results when common libraries are perva-
sively used. In a preliminary study, Wang et al. [36] have
found that over 60% of Android apps’ code is contributed
by common libraries. To increase accuracy in detection, most
recent approaches have been considering filtering out such
libraries, using heuristics.
Malware detection. Recently, researchers have been focusing
on machine learning techniques as scalable means to identify
malicious apps in large datasets. To that end, they usually
extract static features from the code. Unfortunately, the pres-
ence of library code may create significant noise making it
hard to discriminate benign features from malware-specific
ones. To account for such noise, some approaches, such as
MUDFLOW [7], assume that advertisement libraries, which
are common libraries, are trustable. Thus, they simply ignore
all results related to ad libraries, so as to focus on the real app
code.
Code analysis. Besides the false positives that may arise
due to over-approximation, static code analysis is also often
challenged by computing power and memory requirements.
In the case of FlowDroid [5], the state-of-the-art static taint
analysis tool for Android apps, it was reported that the analysis
time can be too high [7]. Let us refer back again to Wang
et al.’s findings, where 60% of app’s code are contributed
by common libraries, which would thus indicate that over
half of the CPU and memory consumption is actually wasted
on irrelevant library code, threatening the performance of the
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com.adobe.air
com.adobe.flashplayer
com.adobe.flashruntime
com.android.pushshow
com.android.systemtool
air.start.game
29C2D4.apk
(air.starq.game.ZRcards9ers)
287198.apk
(com.taiweishiye.tom.pkjjtss)
similarity = 86%
com.adobe.air
com.adobe.flashplayer
com.adobe.flashruntime
com.android.pushshow
com.android.systemtool
com.taiweishiye.tom
similarity = 0%
include libraries
exclude libraries
(a) False Positive.
com.baidu
cn.domob.android
com.v123.util
com.v123.db
com.v123.activity
F3B117.apk
(com.v123.activity)
25BC25.apk
(com.v123.activity)
similarity = 47%
com.baidu
net.youmi.android
com.v123.util
com.v123.db
com.v123.activity
similarity = 84%
include libraries
exclude libraries
(b) False Negative.
Fig. 1: Two motivating examples show the importance of excluding common libraries in order to perform precise piggybacked apps detection.
Note that F3B117.apk and 25BC25.apk are actually signed by different certificates although they share a same package name.
analyzer.
The aforementioned cases constitute strong motivations
for automatically identifying once a large set of common
libraries from market-scale apps, which could then be used
by other approaches to immediately take such libraries into
account. A straightforward solution for achieving such a task
is to build a comprehensive whitelist of common libraries.
Wang et al. [36] claim to have collected more than 600
different common libraries to improve their repackaged app
detection process. However, this collection is not available
to the community, and may not be representative in other
datasets. Other approaches [10], [18], [19], [34] build on top
of limited whitelists collected using simplistic heuristics and
containing between only 9 (AdDroid [34]) and 103 (Bootk et
al. [10]) libraries.
In this paper we investigate the use of common libraries in
Android based on a dataset of around 1.5 million apps col-
lected from the official Google Play market. In particular, we
build and maintain a comprehensive whitelist of 1,113 Android
common libraries that we share with the communities. Our
approach identifies common libraries based on the assumption
that they are used by many apps as such, i.e., without developer
modification. We further label those libraries to distinguish
between advertisement libraries (or ad libraries, a specific
type of common libraries) and others, using heuristics defined
from our manual investigations.
Overall, we make the following contributions:
• An approach to automatically harvest common libraries
from market-scale Android apps. In this work, we collect
1,113 common libraries from a dataset of around 1.5
million Android apps.
• A discriminative study of advertisement libraries, for
which 240 common libraries are recognized as ad li-
braries.
• An empirical investigation and evaluation of the use of
common libraries in Android apps. We show that there
are indeed significant differences in the use of common
libraries between benign and malicious apps. Besides, we
also show that our harvested common libraries are indeed
useful for other approaches, e.g., to reduce both false
positive and false negative rates for piggybacked apps
detection.
• Two comprehensive whitelists of Android libraries (one
for common libraries and the other for ad libraries),
that we make available online to the Android research
community at:
https://github.com/serval-snt-uni-lu/CommonLibraries.git.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
We now motivate our work by discussing the impact of fil-
tering out libraries from apps when performing piggybacking
detection. Piggybacking is an operation that consists in taking
an existing app, unpacking it, then modifying it by adding a
(generally malicious) new payload and re-signing it, before
distributing it as a new app. Like repackaged apps (where
a payload is not necessarily added), piggybacked apps are
now pervasive in the Android ecosystem where they further
constitute an easy way to build and distribute malware [3],
[38], [39]. A typical approach for detecting piggybacked apps
consists in performing pairwise comparisons to identify the
original app that was actually piggybacked. In the process of
computing similarity however, libraries, which may account
for a large portion of apps, can influence towards inaccurate
results. We present two real-world examples of pairs of apps
where the presence of libraries can lead to a mislabelling
of a legitimate app as piggybacked or a failure to flag a
piggybacked app as such.
A. Mislabeling Legitimate apps as Piggybacked
We consider in Fig. 1a the case of two apps
(air.starq.game.ZRcards9ers and com.taiweishiye.tom.pkjjtss)
collected from an Android market. The packages in their
code structure are very similar when considering the common
libraries that they integrate: one app has 86% of its code1
1The percentage is computed based on method level, where more details
will be given in Section III-B.
that is also contained in the other app. However, considering
the results of a prior investigation of a set of 1,169 known
legitimate/piggybacked app pairs where we found that most
of the similarity degree ranges between 81% and 100%, we
could set a threshold of 80% for identifying piggybacking
cases. This unfortunately would lead to a mislabeling in the
above case. Indeed, a detailed analysis of both apps shows
that they are actually using several common libraries (e.g.,
com.android and com.adobe). Excluding such libraries
from the similarity computation, the similarity degree falls
down to 0%, leaving no room for a false positive prediction.
B. Missing True Piggybacked Apps
We now consider in Fig. 1b two apps which are known
to be a legitimate/piggybacked app pair. These apps share
the main package called com.v123.activity. However, library
cn.domob.android was replaced in the piggybacked app with
library net.youmi.android to redirect the revenues of the legit-
imate app to another developer. Nevertheless, although these
two apps are piggybacked from one to another, their similarity
degree is only at 47%, which would constitute a false negative
in our detection scheme with a threshold at 80%. However,
if the detection system identified first the common libraries
and dismissed them during pairwise comparison, the similarity
degree would reach 84%, leading to a successful prediction.
Overall, the validity of pairwise comparison for piggy-
backing detection could be threatened when substantial parts
of app code are common library code. Thus, to limit both
false positives and false negatives, library filtering is now
more and more considered in state-of-the-art repackaging and
piggybacking detection approaches [12], [21], [36]. However,
the whitelists that they leveraged is built based on manual
investigations or automatically with limited datasets. Further-
more, these whitelists are seldom available to other researchers
in the community.
One objective of our work is to provide to the commu-
nity a comprehensive list of common libraries, which
can be used as a whitelist for supporting static code-
based analyses of Android apps.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF COMMON LIBRARIES
In this section we provide details on the approach that we
have devised to collect common libraries for the study.
Process Overview: Fig. 2 illustrates the general process of
our approach, which is dedicated to harvest common libraries
in Android apps and identifying advertisement libraries among
them.
Step 1
Candidate Libraries 
Extraction
Step 2
Common Libraries 
Confirmation
Large Apps Dataset Common Libraries
Step 3
Ad Libraries 
Confirmation
Ad Libraries
Fig. 2: Approach overview.
First, for our approach to make sense, we need a large and
representative dataset of Android apps. Then, as a first step,
we visit all the apps in the dataset and rank all packages
in terms of the frequency of their appearance in apps. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that a package with the
same name in several apps is a candidate library. Thus, Step 1
outputs a ranked list of candidate libraries, where the highest
ranked candidate library has the most recurring package name
in the dataset. In the second step we perform a more fine-
grained pairwise comparison of candidate library code within
apps. The objective of Step 2 is to confirm as common library
packages those recurring packages that have the same name
and are very similar in their code. Finally, in Step 3, we
further investigate the harvested libraries to label those that
are advertisement libraries and thus may be treated differently
in some Android analysis approaches.
We now provide details on how each step works in the
following three subsections.
A. Step 1: Candidate Libraries Extraction
We assume that common libraries are such software pack-
ages that are:
• used in a large number of apps – recurring packages have
very high probability of being common libraries.
• used by developers without modifications – their code
must be similar across apps. Hu et al. [22] have found
that over 80% of libraries are indeed used without mod-
ification in their dataset of 100,000 Google Play apps.
Building on those assumptions, and leveraging a large
dataset, we extract all package names from Android apps and
cluster them based on their frequency of occurrence in the
dataset. Theoretically, packages that appear in at least two apps
could be taken as candidate libraries2. To reduce the number of
distinct packages considered as candidate libraries, and which
must be further processed we consider two constraints:
• We only consider the first three segments3 of package
name or the entire name if there are less than 3 segments.
With this constraint we manage to limit the number of
redundant subpackages while still guaranteeing a large
diversity in package names.
• We also exclude packages with names starting with
android.support. Indeed, there are many sub-packages
within this package and they are used pervasively in
Android apps. Furthermore, since these are part of the
Android framework, we do not consider them in our
study.
B. Step 2: Common Libraries Confirmation
Because package naming is done in Java programming
with limited constraints, any two packages may share the
same name while being completely different in terms of code
functionalities. Also, the frequency of a package name may
2Actually this may not be true if the apps are from a same developer.
However, since we are performing experiments on a large set of apps, this
small deviation will not impact our final results.
3In this paper, we use the term segment to describe each domain of different
levels, e.g., for package org.example, we say it contains two segments, which
are org and example.
Library 
Candidates
one segment
package obfuscated
prefix of other 
packages
NO NO NO
similar code 
structure
Common 
Libraries
YES
less than 
10 apps
NO
Fig. 3: Refinement process for common libraries identification
actually be contributed by piggybacking operations, obfus-
cation activities (e.g., a.a.a or com.a are recurrent in many
obfuscated apps) or simplistic naming (e.g., debug or mobile
package names). Thus, we must refine the list collected in the
previous step with code similarity measurements to find actual
code packages used as common libraries.
Beforehand, given the expensive property of pairwise com-
parison, we use heuristics to exclude from the candidate
libraries outputted by Step 1, those packages which would
be irrelevant. Our refinement process is shown in Fig. 3.
1) At first, we focus on those packages whose names appear
in more than 10 apps to reduce the number of candidate
libraries to the most relevant ones.
2) Then, we remove such packages whose names contain
only one segment. Although such short names are indeed likely
to be redundant in several apps, they are not likely to be
those of packages that will be distributed as common libraries.
Indeed, to prevent package name collisions, one convention in
Java package naming4 recommends organisations/development
teams to use their reversed Internet domain names (e.g.,
com.facebook) to begin their package names, which justifies
our assumption that common libraties, intended for wide
distribution, have package names with several segments.
3) Next, we undertake to exclude packages with obfus-
cated code. However, because there is currently no advanced
approach for checking whether a package is obfuscated or
not, we build on a naive approach based on observations of
several obfuscated apps: every package that contains a single
letter segment (e.g., d of com.idreamsky.d) is considered as
obfuscated.
4) To further reduce the number of candidates, we exclude
such packages that are prefixes of other packages (e.g., we
remove package com.sansec if package com.sansec.AESlib
exists). The idea behind this decision is that on the one hand
long packages would indicate more fine-grained examination
while, on the other hand, short packages would increase the
chance of being duplicated (by accident).
5) Finally in the last step, we perform package similarity
analysis to discriminate common library packages from normal
app code package. Given p, a package name, and A, a set of
apps which include a package named p, our similarity analysis
works in three steps:
• Pairwise combinations of apps. We consider all the pair-
wise combinations of apps with package name p. Recall
that every considered package name p was selected as
candidate because it appears in at least 10 apps. Thus,
for any given p, there are at least
(
10
2
)
= 45 pairs to
compare. Google’s ad package com.google.ads is the one
for which A is the largest (247,394 apps), leading to
4https://newcircle.com/bookshelf/java fundamentals tutorial/packaging
a over 30 billions pairs that require comparisons. For
scalability reasons, we randomly select for each case of a
package name p, 10 pairs of apps, allowing us to assess
whether this package name indeed represents a common
package code across the apps.
• Method Comparisons. Analysis of a pair of apps is
performed by computing the similarity between their
methods. This similarity takes into account not only the
signatures of apps but also their respective contents. Two
methods, from two different apps, with the same signature
are said to be identical only when their contents are the
same. Otherwise, they are simply said to be similar. Such
methods may exist between two packages of the same
library in several cases: a method in one library package
may been modified to insert malicious payload during
piggybacking operations; different obfuscation algorithms
applied on different apps that include the same library
may produce methods with the same signature but dif-
ferent contents. To limit the impact of obfuscation, we
proceed to abstract the contents of methods by comparing
the types of statements (e.g., “invoke”) in the Jimple
code, leaving out all names of variables/fields/methods.
However, since obfuscation is not expected to modify
SDK API methods, we also take into account the names
of such methods. Eventually, the similarity of methods is
computed as a simple text differencing.
• Similarity Analysis.
In the last step, we finally perform pairwise similarity
analysis for packages with the same name p. There are
two thresholds, namely tp and ta, which are involved
in the similarity analysis. First, we consider that two
packages p1 and p2 correspond to the same common
library p if p1 and p2 are identical or are at least similar up
to a threshold tp. Second, because of the known common
phenomenon of repackaging/piggybacking in Android,
which may nullify the package similarity (because they
are probably from the same original app), we must
dismiss cases where a the similarity score of the pair
of apps (app1 and app2) is higher than a threshold ta.
Note that the similarity between apps is computed at
the method level (i.e., what percentage of methods are
identical or similar between the apps?).
To summarize, for similarity analysis, given a pair of apps
(app1, app2), we compute four metrics: identical (i.e., the
number of methods that are exactly the same, both in terms
of signatures and implementation), similar (i.e., the number
of methods having the same signature but with different
contents), deleted (i.e., the number of methods that exist
in app1 but not in app2), and new (i.e., the number of
methods existing only in app2). These metrics are indeed good
indicators for comparison and have been leveraged in state-
of-the-art Android similarity tools, such as Androguard [15].
Given these metrics, we can compute the similarity between
the pair (app1, app2) using Formula 1.
similarity = max{ identical
total − new ,
identical
total − deleted} (1)
where
total = identical + similar + deleted+ new (2)
Note that we use the same formula to perform the similarity
analysis of a given pair of packages (p1, p2), except that the
metrics are computed by counting methods in packages rather
than in apps (e.g. identical is the number of methods that
are exactly the same in p1 and p2, deleted is the number of
methods that exist in p1 but not in p2, etc.)
C. Step 3: Identification of Ad Libraries
A specific example of type of widespread common libraries
in Android is advertisement libraries. Such libraries are indeed
used pervasively as they constitute one of the main ways for
app developers to be rewarded for their development effort.
Ad libraries are also often inserted during piggybacking to
redirect revenues. Their presence in an app also often lead
antivirus products to flag them as adware. Recent approaches
for Android security analysis are now processing ad library
code in a specific way to reduce false positives. For example,
MUDFLOW [7] simply does not report any potential sensitive
data leaks through ad libraries, as they might be legitimate. To
that end, they have leveraged a limited whitelist of 12 libraries.
In this context, we propose to further mine our collected set of
common libraries to identify a large set of ad libraries which
could be leveraged to improve the results of Android analyses.
To that end, we consider a basic method of detection based
on the library name and a more semantic approach based on
the characteristics of ad libraries.
1) Keywords matching: We note that ad library package
names generally contain keywords that include the term “ad”.
Widespread examples of such packages are com.google.ads
and com.adsdk.sdk. Unfortunately, simply matching “ad” in
the package name would lead to substantial portion of false
positives as several library package names have “ad” in their
segments which are common words (e.g., shadow, gadget,
load, adapter, adobe). Thus, to work around this limitation,
we collect all English words containing “ad” from SCOWL5
(accounting for a total of 13,385 words), and dismiss packages
containing such words as potential ad libraries.
2) Ad features investigations: We consider samples from
a list of ad packages summarized by Grace et al. [19] and
manually investigate how ad libraries differentiate from other
common libraries, and infer a set of features whose presence
in a package would justify the tag of ad library.
Internet usage: All investigated libraries unsurpris-
ingly require access to Internet to remotely upload to
a server some viewing statistics and update ad con-
tents. Thus, apps integrating add libraries also require
5Spell Checker Oriented Word Lists: http://wordlist.aspell.net
the android.permission.INTERNET permission. Given
this fact, we can already exclude a number of common
libraries, which appear in apps without Internet access, as
ad libraries. However, given that an app may requests the
INTERNET permission for its own needs, we cannot imme-
diately state that a common library in such an app is an add
library. Instead we must investigate whether the code of such
an app indeed declares uses Internet-related APIs. To that end,
we leveraged the whitelist of such APIs, originally shared
by PSCout [6], to produce candidate ad libraries among the
common libraries.
Components declaration: Our manual investigations have
also revealed that ad libraries often contain components,
mainly Activities, for facilitating users’ ad-related interactions
(e.g., switching to a new full-screen ad page when users click
on an advertisement banner). As a concrete example, MoPub6
is an advertisement library targeting both Android and iOS.
To integrate this library in their apps, developers must declare
four components in their apps’ manifest file. One component in
particular, MraidVideoPlayerActivity is necessary for video ads
to work properly. Thus, when a library package is associated
to a declared component, we flag it as a potential ad library.
Views declaration: In Android, advertisements are gener-
ally set to be visualized, which from in Android programming
imply the use of view gadgets (i.e., classes extended from
android.view.View). Thus, we check whether there are
View-based classes under a common library to flag it as
candidate ad library.
D. Implementation details
We implement our approach through several languages
such as Java and shell/python scripts. In step 1, we leverage
Apktool7 to disassemble Android apps. Given an android app,
we extract the prefixes of paths of smali files (a format used
by Apktool to represent Android apps’ code) to represent its
packages. Then, we cluster all the packages of investigated
apps together and rank them through their repeated times. The
packages whose size are greater than a given threshold are
selected as library candidates.
The code similarity analysis in step 2 and the ad li-
brary conformation in step 3 are implemented in Java. More
specifically, both of them leverage Soot [23] to achieve their
functionality and work in the Jimple code level, where Soot
is a framework for analyzing and transforming Java/Android
apps while Jimple is an intermediate representation of Soot.
The transformation from Android Dalvik bytecode into Jimple
code is powered by Dexpler [8], which currently is available
as a plugin in Soot.
IV. DATASET AND RESULTS
In this section, we first disclose our evaluated data set
in Section IV-A and then we present our overall findings
including both common libraries and also ad libraries in
Section IV-B. Finally, we present further statistics on the
libraries in Section IV-C and Section IV-D.
6https://github.com/mopub/mopub-android-sdk
7https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/
A. Dataset
Our data set is made up of 1,455,516 (around 1.5 million)
apps that are collected from the official Google market (Google
Play) over several months. This data set has already been
applied for large-scale experiments on Android researches
such as malware detection [2], [3], [24] and piggybacked apps
detection [27]. We have sent all the apps into VirusTotal to
check whether they are malicious or not. Among the 1,455,516
apps, 311,490 (nearly 21%) of them are flagged by at least one
anti-virus product hosted on VirusTotal while 65,079 (nearly
4%) apps are flagged by at least five anti-virus products.
B. Overall Results
TABLE I: Summary of our investigation results.
Type Number
#. of packages (total) 7,710,505
#. of packages (distinct) 676,674
#. of packages (Nshared apps > 10) 19,725
#. of packages (one segment) 613
#. of packages (obfuscated) 1,461
#. of packages (prefix of others) 919
Size of final set of candidate common libraries 16,732
Table I illustrates the overall results of our investigation
on a data set of around 1.5 million apps. In total, we collect
676,674 distinct package names, where we filter out 656,949
package names that are used by at most 10 apps, leading
to a set of 19,715 package names. We further dismiss 2,993
from consideration thanks to our library refinement process.
Those 2,993 package names are composed of 613 one segment
packages, 1,461 obfuscated packages and 919 packages that
are prefix of other packages. Finally, we perform pairwise
similarity analysis for 16,732 packages. For each package, we
randomly select 10 pairs of apps to do the comparison. As
long as there are positive results, we consider it as a common
library, and verse visa.
TABLE II: Results of common libraries with different thresholds: tp
for package-level and ta for app-level. Common libraries are select
if and only if their package-level similarities are bigger than tp while
their app-level similarities are smaller than ta.
tp\ta 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.9 1,113 2,148 3,173 4,072
0.8 1,363 2,564 3,715 4,685
0.7 1,573 2,898 4,117 5,144
0.6 1,735 3,179 4,452 5,509
1) Results of Common Libraries: Our common libraries se-
lection is actually depending on the two thresholds introduced
in Section III: ta for app-level similarity and tp for package-
level similarity. The precision of our results is positively
correlated to tp while negatively correlated to ta. Indeed, the
bigger tp is, the higher the probability that a given candidate
library is an actual common library, giving the assumption that
libraries are not modified when they are used among apps. On
the other hand, the smaller ta is, the lower the probability that
the compared two apps are repackaged/piggybacked from one
to another. Recall that if two apps are repackaged/piggybacked
from one to another, the similarity of packages would become
meaningless, as in this case, most packages would be the same,
without being necessarily common libraries.
Table II illustrates the results of common libraries with
different thresholds. The final number of common libraries
range from 1,113 to 5,509. To better refer to our results in the
remainder of the paper, we name CLp,a the set of Common
Libraries that are selected with the thresholds tp and ta. For
example, CL9,1 stands for the precise set of 1,113 common
libraries we harvest with tp = 0.9 and ta = 0.1, while
CL6,4 stands for the more “loose” set of common libraries,
which although is the biggest set, contains potential more false
positives (less precise than CL9,1).
TABLE III: Results of ad libraries.
Description #. of Libraries
Ad-related keyword matching 275
Ad characteristic-based investigating 822
Merge (conservative ad libraries) 1050
Manual confirmation (keyword matching) 222
Manual confirmation (characteristic investigating) 137
Merge (precise ad libraries) 240
2) Results of Ad Libraries: We then distill ad libraries from
the previously harvested common libraries. We start from the
CL6,4 library set and performs two types of refinement: 1)
ad-related keywords matching and 2) ad characteristic-based
investigation. The refinement results are presented in Table III.
Ad-related keywords matching. By following the process
described in Section III-C, we were able to automatically
harvest 275 ad libraries.
Ad characteristic-based investigating. We have observed
three characteristics that ad libraries may have in Section III-C.
Fig. 4 shows the results of our investigation. Among the 5,509
libraries in CL6,4, 1,248 of them request the INTERNET
permission, 1,560 have declared View gadgets and 1,388
have declared components. The intersection results are also
illustrated in Fig. 4. In this work, we take the intersection of
all the three characteristics as potential ad libraries, leading to
a set of 822 ad libraries.
In the next step, we merge the aforementioned two ad
libraries sets, leading to a sef of 1,050 ad libraries. In the
remainder of the paper, we name this set AD1050.
Comp-declaration
1,388
VIew-declaration
1,560
INTERNET-permission
1,248
1,202
888 936
822
Fig. 4: Investigation results of different characteristics for ad libraries.
Manual confirmation. As far as we know, AD1050 is cur-
rently the largest set of ad libraries existing in the community.
However, because we start from CL6,4, mainly to start with
the biggest set (minimizing the miss of libraries), AD1050 may
contain false positives. To this end, we perform a fast but
aggressive manual refinement, where only clear ad libraries8
are taken into account. As a result, 240 libraries are confirmed
as ad libraries9, hereinafter we refer to this set as AD240. This
240 ad libraries are highly precise. We argue that a highly
precise ad library set is important, which plays as a basement
that makes it possible for other approaches to also yield precise
results.
C. Popularity of common libraries
Fig. 5 lists the top 20 common libraries and indicates, for
each, the number of apps in which they are used. The top
used library is com.google.ads, which is used by 247,394 apps
(nearly 17%) of our data set. Moreover, the results suggest that
developers often use libraries which are proposed by popular
(well-known) companies such as Google or Facebook.
twitter4j.util
twitter4j.api
twitter4j.conf
com.flurry.android
org.apache.cordova
com.facebook.internal
com.facebook.model
com.facebook.widget
com.google.gson
org.apache.http
com.actionbarsherlock.view
com.actionbarsherlock.app
com.actionbarsherlock.widget
org.apache.commons
com.actionbarsherlock.internal
com.android.vending
com.google.analytics
com.facebook.android
com.google.android
com.google.ads
31537
31589
31711
38051
41077
45552
45569
46208
50194
51870
52556
52972
52980
53415
53529
57369
73087
81266
222221
247394
Fig. 5: Popularity of the top 20 common libraries in our investigation,
and the number of apps in which they are used.
The most used common library in Android apps is
com.google.ads, an adverstisement library included in
nearly 17% of apps.
D. Proportion of Library code in App code
We then look into the percentage of Android apps code
which come from libraries. To this end, we consider the
libraries present in CL9,1 and a set of 10,000 apps randomly
selected from our initial set of apps. For each app, we compute
the size of the CL9,1 libraries (sizelib, in bytes) presented in
the app and the size of the whole app (sizeapp). We finally
compute the portion p of the use of common libraries through
p = sizelib/sizeapp. The experimental results vary from 0 to
0.99, giving a median value 0.41. Among the 10,000 apps,
4,293 (42.9%) of them have used more code in libraries than
in their real logic (p >= 0.5). This results show that Android
apps are indeed using common libraries pervasively.
8Their corresponding web pages have explicitly claimed that they function
advertisements.
9This does not mean the remaining 810 libraries are not ad libraries.
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Fig. 6: Library usage between benign and antivirus-flagged apps
42% of our sampled app packages contain more com-
mon library code than specific app code. On average,
41% of an Android app code is contributed by common
libraries.
V. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS
Beyond the initial goal to provide a comprehensive and pub-
licly accessible whitelist of Android libraries, we investigate
some potential benefits of having such a list. In particular,
based on the collected dataset of libraries we study the
following research questions:
• Are libraries used similarly by benign and malicious
apps? Can they be used as naive features for learning
anti-virus predictions?
• What improvements to Android analysis can be brought
with an access to our harvested libraries? In particular
what is the impact of taking into account our set of
libraries on the performance of piggybacking detection
and machine learning-based malware detection?
• To what extent is the set of collected ad libraries exhaus-
tive compared to baseline from VirusTotal?
A. RQ1: Benign vs. Antivirus-flagged Apps
With this research question, we are interested in investi-
gating the differences in library usage between benign and
antivirus-flagged apps. To this end, we randomly select 20,000
apps, 10,000 benign and 10,000 flagged by at least one anti-
virus product hosted by VirusTotal10.
Among the 20,000 apps, 5,424 benign ones and 8,580
flagged ones use at least one common library. In total, 892 out
of the 1,113 CL91 common libraries are used. Figure 6a shows
the boxplot with the number of common libraries used by each
app in both categories. The median value for benign apps is
1 whereas the median value is 3 for antivirus-flagged apps.
We confirm that this difference is significant by performing a
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test. Benign apps thus use
less libraries than anti-virus flagged ones.
We further study whether this is related to advertisement
libraries. Among the 240 libraries in AD240, 98 of them are
used by 1,332 benign apps and 3,209 antivirus-flagged apps.
Figure 6b shows the boxplot which suggests that antivirus-
flagged apps contain significantly more ad libraries than be-
nign apps.
10https://www.virustotal.com
In addition to the quantitative comparison, we investigate
whether the appearance of the collected common libraries can
be used to discriminate antivirus-flagged apps11 from benign
apps through machine learning-based malware classification.
To this end, we leverage RandomForest algorithm [11] to
perform 10-fold cross-validation on the 20,000 apps con-
sidered above. Each app is represented by a feature vector
where the package name of each common library is taken
as a feature. Recall that we have collected 892 libraries
from those 20,000 apps. Therefore, our machine learning-
based experiments contain 892 features. Table IV illustrates
the results of our machine-learning-based malware detection
through 4 different settings, which are
• E1: Machine-learning experiments using the entire set
of 20,000 apps.
• E2: Some apps do not contain any of our harvested
libraries, leading to empty feature vector which can lead
to mis-classifications. Thus, we conduct an experiment
taking into account only apps which include at least one
of our collected common libraries.
• E3: We replay the experiment E2 where we ensure that
there is no class imbalance: we randomly select 5,424
apps from the 8,580 antivirus-flagged apps.
• E4: Similarly to experiment E3, we repeat E2 with
a balanced dataset by oversampling the Benign set,
using the Synthetic Minority Oversampling TEchnique
(SMOTE) [17].
The results of all experiments, showed in Table IV, indicate
good discriminative power of library features for machine-
learning based detection of AV-flagged apps.
TABLE IV: Results of our machine-learning-based detection of AV-
flagged apps.
Exp. Benign set AV-flagged set Precision Recall F-Measure
E1 10,000 10,000 0.841 0.835 0.835
E2 5,424 8,580 0.861 0.861 0.861
E3 5,424 5,424 0.862 0.860 0.860
E4 8,580 8,580 0.875 0.873 0.873
Benign apps use significantly less common libraries
than AV-flagged apps. The combinations of libraries
in apps can be discriminated between benign and AV-
flagged apps.
B. RQ2: Improvements to Analysis Approaches
In this section, we discuss two cases where our harvested
common libraries show significant improvements to the per-
formance of Android analysis approaches.
1) Piggybacking detection: Recall that in Section II, we
have shown that piggybacking detection approaches are likely
to yield false positives and false negatives if code contributed
by common libraries are not taken into account. We provide
more empirical evidence of such threats.
For our experiments we rely on a set of pairs of apps
that we have collected and regrouped into two categories: the
11In this work, we consider those antivirus-flagged apps as potentially
malicious.
first category, FNData, contains 761 pairs of apps where the
smilarity score for each pair is below 50% while the second
category, FPData, includes 1,100 pairs of apps where the
similarity score of each pair of apps is over 80%. Given
the previously justified threshold of 80% for deciding on
piggybacking (cf. Section II), we assume that all pairs in
FPData are piggybacked pairs while those in FNData are not.
We now explore again the similarity scores of the pairs when
excluding from each app the common libraries (in CL91) they
may include.
False positives elimination. Among the 1,100 pairs of apps
in FPData, 1,029 (93.5%) remained similar above the 80%
threshold. 71 (6.5%) pairs of apps now have similarity scores
below 80%, and can no longer be supposed to be piggybacked
pairs. We manually verified 10 of pairs and found that they
are indeed not piggybacked.
False negatives re-classification. Among the 761 pairs of
apps in FNData, 110 (14%) have higher similarity scores,
among which 2 pairs are now beyond the threshold of 80%
which would allows to re-classify them as piggybacked pairs.
We have manually verified and confirmed that these two pairs
of apps are piggybacked pairs: one pair was previously used
in our motivating example section (Fig. 1b).
2) Machine learning for Malware detection: We in-
vestigate the case of machine-learning based approaches for
Android, and study the impact of ignoring or taking into
account common libraries on the accuracy of prediction. We
consider a case study based on MUDFLOW [7] and its dataset.
This dataset contains sensitive data leaks information for
15,096 malicious apps and 2,800 benign apps. MUDFLOW
is a relevant example as the authors have originally foreseen
the problem with libraries and thus attempted to exclude
a small set of ad libraries in their experiments. With our
large harvested dataset of common libraries, we investigate
the performance gap that can be achieved by excluding more
known libraries.
MUDFLOW performs machine learning to mine apps that
use sensitive data abnormally. More specifically, MUDFLOW
takes each distinct type of sensitive data leak (from pre-defined
source to sink) and performs an one-class classification to
detect abnormal apps. One-class classification is realistic in
their experimental settings with their imbalanced data set (they
have much more malicious apps than benign apps).
Since our goal is not to replicate MUDFLOW (along with its
sophisticated library-unrelated parameters), but to evaluate the
impact of excluding common libraries for machine learning,
we propose to implement a slightly simplified approach for our
experiments. Unlike MUDFLOW, which constructs a training
set based on benign apps and then applies it to predict
unknown apps, we simply perform 10-fold cross validation
in our evaluation. As we are working on the same imbalanced
data, we also choose one-class classification.
We have performed four types of experiments, which are
detailed below:
• E5: We evaluate on all the 15,096 malicious apps. The
feature set is made up of distinct sensitive data leaks.
Instead of taking into account source and sink methods,
each data leak is represented through the source and
sink categories (e.g., methods like Log.i(), Log.e() are
represented as category LOG).
• E6: This experiment has similar settings as in E5, except
that such sensitive data leaks that are contributed by the
12 ad libraries considered by MUDFLOW are excluded.
• E7: This experiment has similar settings as in E6. In this
case however, the excluded set of libraries is the most
constrained set of 1,113 libraries harvested in our work.
• E8: This experiment has similar settings as in E7. In this
case however, the excluded set of libraries is constituted
by libraries selected based on a more loose definition
of libraries. The excluding set contains 5,509 libraries,
which may include a number of false positives.
The results of these four experiments are shown in Table V.
Comparing E7 to E5, the accuracy is indeed increased, which
suggests that the presence of common libraries code could con-
fuse machine learning-based classifier. However, the accuracy
remained the same between E6 and E5, suggesting that the
MUDFLOW whitelist, which contains 12 libraries, is too small
to impact the final results. Interestingly, with our largest set
of libraries, the accuracy of E8 decreases slightly comparing
to that of E7. This suggests that the precision in common
library identification is important: excluding non-library code
will eventually decrease the overall performance for machine
learning.
TABLE V: Results of our machine learning based experiments
performed on the data set provided by MUDFLOW [7].
Seq. #. of Features Excluding Libs Accuracy
1 109 0 81.85%
2 109 12 (MUDFLOW [7]) 81.85%
3 109 1,113 (tp = 0.9,ta = 0.1) 83.10%
4 108 5,509 (tp = 0.6,ta = 0.4) 83.01%
It is possible to reduce false positive and false negative
rates for piggybacking detections and malware predic-
tion by excluding libraries based on a comprehensive
whitelist. These case studies suggest that library code
can mislead Android analysis, and our harvested set of
common libraries can indeed be used to improve state-
of-the-art approaches’ performance.
C. RQ3: Completeness of our harvested ad libraries
VirusTotal is a free service that hosts about 40 antivirus
products for analyzing suspicious files, including Android
apps. Along with entirely malicious apps, VirusTotal is also
able to identify adware and provide information in the labels.
However, AV labels are not homogeneous, and there is no
standard for naming malware and adware. After manually
inspecting several results of VirusTotal, we have observed
seven keywords (cf. Table VI) that are commonly leveraged
by VirusTotal AV to tag adware.
In this study, we first select a set of apps that are flagged
by VirusTotal as adware, and then we inspect whether those
apps could have been tagged as adware based simply on
TABLE VI: The seven keywords (without case-insensitive matching)
that we manually observed for inferring adware from the results of
VirusTotal.
adware adsware addisplay adswo adwo adrads “multi ads”
adware adwo adsware addisplay multi ads adswo adrads
Baseline
AD−1050
AD−240
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
Fig. 7: Investigation results of comparing our ad libraries to the
adware results of VirusTotal.
package matching with our harvested libraries. In this study,
we consider 10,000 randomly sampled apps which are flagged
by at least one antivirus product of VirusTotal (the flagged
labels are not necessarily for adware). Among the 10,000 apps,
8,120 (81.2%) of them are flagged as adware following the
keywords described above. Based on the two ad sets that we
have harvested before, we are able to flag 5,045 of them for
AD240 and 6,916 of them for AD1050 as adware, giving a
completeness of 62% and 82%, respectively.
Fig. 7 presents the fine-grained results, categorized through
different ad-keywords. Our harvested ad libraries perform
almost perfectly for five keywords out of the total seven
keywords. However, the performance on “adware” and “addis-
play” keywords are less stable, indicating that our harvested
ad libraries are still missing some less widespread libraries.
Although our harvested ad libraries are currently the
largest publicly accessible set, it is not yet complete
enough to cover all ad packages. Nevertheless, we
believe that our harvested libraries still constitute a
significant set for other to boost analysis.
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY AND DISCUSSION
Because there is no convention for specifying that a code
package represents a library, identifying Android common
libraries is challenging. We were able to perform our study by
mining about 1,5 million apps collected over several months.
Our study however presents a few threats to validity:
Currently, our approach is not fully aware of obfuscation,
which may lead to incomplete results. However, our findings
are based on a large datasets of apps to reduce the influence
of obfuscated apps. Besides, our findings could be leveraged
in settings where for example ad-libraries are represented by
features which are resilient to obfuscation (e.g., called SDK
API methods). In future work, we plan to conduct experiments
for validating this possibility.
In this work, we do not take into account the different ver-
sions of libraries. Thus, the validity of our similarity analysis
could be threatened, as the similarity of two versions of a
library could vary significantly. However, as our experiments
are done on a large scale of apps, this threaten is somewhat
mitigated by the variety and the scale of our dataset.
Our investigation into libraries have also revealed interesting
findings on the use of libraries:
• well-used libraries, such as unit3d, are often used as the
compromising point for malicious apps.
• Malware writers often name their malicious compo-
nents after famous and pervasively used libraries from
reputed firms: e.g., the DroidKungFu malware fam-
ily spreads malicious payload within a package called
com.google.update. Our similarity analysis allowed to
detect such fraud by further investigating outliers.
VII. RELATED WORK
At first, we discuss a batch of works that investigate the
issues related to libraries. Then, we show that even if libraries
are not harmful by themselves, they threaten the validity of
other approaches. Finally, we summarize the works that are
dedicated to the identification of Android libraries.
Problems of Libraries. As reported by Hu et al. [22],
Android libraries are currently suffering three threats: 1)
the library modification threat, where normal libraries can
be modified to be malicious. Our previous work has also
confirmed this findings [27]. 2) the masquerading threat,
e.g., a well-known malware family called DroidKungFu uses
names such as com.google.update to pretend the services are
provided by Google [40]. 3) the aggressive library threat,
where some legitimate libraries have aggressive behaviors such
as collecting users’ email address.
Other works [10], [25], [26] done by us and by others, have
also shown that some libraries frequently and aggressively
collect (leak) users’ private information. For instance, the
most common leaked information is the device id, which is
used by ad libraries to uniquely identify a user. This findings
are in line with the investigation of Stevens et al. [35], in
which the authors show that, through libraries, users can be
tracked by a network sniffer across ad providers and by an
ad provider across apps. Besides, they also argue that ad
libraries usually require permissions beyond their real needs
and some bad programmed libraries use Android’s Javascript
extension mechanism insecurely. AdRisk [19] focuses on
detecting privacy and security risks posed by ad libraries. Most
notably, it shows that some libraries even execute untrusted
code from internet sources. Moreover, those untrusted code
are fetched through an unsafe mechanism, which by itself has
caused serious security risks.
Gui et al. [20] have shown that free ad libraries actually
come with hidden cost for developers such as the rating of
apps. As reported by Mojica et al. [32], ad libraries are indeed
impacting the ratings of Android apps.
Although our work in this paper is not dedicated to identify
problems of libraries, our findings, the list of common (ad)
libraries, can definitely benefit other approaches (e.g., API
studies [9], [28]–[30]) by giving them a good starting point
for thorough analysis.
Research Works threatened by Libraries. Researchers
have noticed Android libraries will definitely influence the
results of app clone detection [12]–[14], [31], [36], most of
them use a list of libraries as a whitelist. Detecting and filtering
third-party libraries for clone detection is important, as the
results may be doomed if the studied apps are dominated
by common libraries. Chen et al. [12] leverage a whitelist
containing 73 libraries in their approach, which is far away
from being a complete whitelist of existing libraries, as
shown in [36], over 600 distinct libraries have been identified.
However, this list is not publicly available. Besides, comparing
to our findings in this paper, this list is also considerably
incomplete.
Not only for clone detection, but also for machine learning-
based malware detection, the results are threatened by common
libraries. MUDFLOW [7], as an example, uses a list of 12
well-known ad libraries as a whitelist, to exclude such features
that fill in them. A later work done by Li et al. [24] also
leverage that list in their machine learning-based malware
detection.
Our work, in this paper, provides a comprehensive list of
common libraries, that can be leveraged by other approaches
and thus to significantly refine their results.
Identification of Libraries. Wang et al. [36] uses an
automated clustering technique to detect common libraries,
in which they have found over 600 distinct libraries. Our
approach is in line with their assumptions on common li-
braries, however, we come with a different approach and
we also discriminate ad libraries from common libraries, for
which they have not. Another approach called AdDetect [33],
identifies Android ad libraries through their semantics (e.g.,
the usage of Android components, or specific APIs) and
then performs a ML-based classification to detect ad libraries.
However, this approach does not report any findings that can
benefit the Android research community.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented our process for collecting a set of 1,113
common libraries and 240 ad libraries from a dataset of about
1.5 million Android apps. To the best of our knowledge, these
two sets are the largest ones that are publicly accessible in the
community of Android research.
We empirically illustrate how these two library sets can be
used as whitelists by Android analysis approaches to improve
their performances. More specifically, we have shown that
two approaches, namely piggybacking detection and machine
learning-based malware detection, can indeed benefit from our
harvested libraries.
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